管理者短视主义对民营企业“漂绿”行为的影响研究——基于内外部治理因素的调节效应分析

The Impact of Managerial Myopia on Corperate Greenwashing Behaviors in Private Enterprises: A Moderating Effect Analysis of Internal and External Governance Factors

摘要:

文章以2012—2023年中国沪深A股上市民营企业为样本,基于时间认知理论和高阶梯队理论,实证检验了管理者短视主义对民营企业"漂绿"行为的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:管理者短视主义会显著促进民营企业"漂绿"行为,当公司股权集中度(内部治理因素)和政府环境治理、分析师关注度(外部治理因素)越高时,管理者短视主义对"漂绿"的促进作用越容易受到抑制。机制检验表明,管理者短视主义通过弱化内控质量与加剧融资约束的双重路径显著加剧了民营企业"漂绿"行为。此外,在民营企业CEO缺乏绿色经历、企业所在区域市场化程度低且非低碳试点城市的样本中,管理者短视主义对"漂绿"的效应更为突出。文章揭示了管理者时间导向影响企业"漂绿"行为的微观机理,为民营企业绿色转型的治理现代化提供了理论借鉴。

Abstract:

Using data from China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed private enterprises from 2012 to 2023, this study, based on emporal orientation theory and upper echelons theory, empirically examines the impact of managerial myopia on corporate greenwashing and its mechanism. It finds that managerial myopia significantly exacerbates greenwashing in private enterprises. Also, mechanism tests demonstrate that managerial myopia intensifies greenwashing through dual pathways: weakening internal control quality and aggravating financing constraints. The positive effect of managerial myopia on greenwashing is substantially mitigated when internal governance factors (i.e., ownership concentration) and external governance factors (i.e., government environmental regulation and analyst coverage) are strengthened. Still, heterogeneity analysis shows that the greenwashing-promoting effect of managerial myopia is more pronounced in subsamples with CEOs lacking green experience, lower marketization levels, and non-low-carbon pilot cities. In this sense, this study uncovers the micro-level mechanisms through which managerial temporal orientation influences greenwashing behaviors, thus providing theoretical insights for modernizing governance in private enterprises’ green transition.